This paper provides some empirical evidence on a relatively new and increasingly prevalent form of equity restructuring called tracking stock. We identify the effects associated with tracking stock announcements by excluding from our sample those announcement events that include other significant news announcements on the event date, such as announcements of acquisitions and earnings. For the 35 announcement events that fit this criteria, we find a mean abnormal return of over 3 percent in the two-day period surrounding the announced proposal to issue a tracking stock, with 30 of the 35 firms in the sample earning positive abnormal returns.
Introduction
This paper provides some empirical evidence on a relatively new and increasingly prevalent form of equity restructuring called tracking stock by examining the reaction of share prices to announcements proposing a tracking stock. By comparing returns relative to those predicted by a market model, we find a mean abnormal return of over 3 percent in the two-day period surrounding the announcement for a sample of 35 firms. Individually, 30 of the 35 firms earned positive abnormal returns. These estimates are comparable quantitatively to previous estimates of abnormal returns associated with announcements of carve-outs and spin-offs.
Tracking stock, also known as "targeted" or "lettered" 1 stock in the financial press, is a class of common stock that is linked to the performance of a specific business group within a diversified firm. Tracking stock was first issued in 1984, but has been more widely implemented only very recently. Six years after its introduction, a total of two tracking stocks had been issued. In the year 1999, sixteen tracking stocks were proposed, with several more rumored to be imminent.
There currently exists a relatively small literature on tracking stocks. Hass (1996) provides an excellent survey of legal issues associated with the tracking stock structure. Logue, Seward, and Walsh (1996) detail important features of tracking stocks and find some evidence of abnormal returns associated with an announcement to issue a tracking stock, but, constrained by a very small sample of nine firms, do not conduct statistical inference. Even more recent studies, such as Billett and Mauer (2000) , D'Souza and Jacob (2000) , and Zuta (1999) , are constrained by relatively small samples. For example, the former two studies include 18 and 12 non-acquisition related announcements, respectively, and, constrained by sample size, do not exclude announcements contaminated by other major simultaneous events such as earnings announcements that confound identification of the price effect associated with the announcement of the tracking stock. Moreover, the distributions of the relevant test statistics are justified only asymptotically. Drawing from a much larger population of 51 tracking stock announcements, this paper carefully identifies price effects associated with tracking stock announcements by excluding those announcement events that occur simultaneously with other significant announcements.
Tracking stocks possess some very unusual features relative to the product of related, but more conventional, equity restructurings such as carve-outs and spin-offs. Both carve-outs and spin-offs create a new corporate entity by distributing equity in a subsidiary outside the parent corporation. Shareholders in the new firm typically possess the rights conventionally due shareholders: the right to elect a board of directors, the right to vote on matters of significant importance, and a claim against the firm's net assets. Shareholders of a tracking stock, however, do not elect directors to oversee management of the tracked business group, nor do they have a claim against the assets of the tracked group. The primary feature that links the tracking stock to the tracked business group is a limited claim on the future earnings of that group.
These unconventional features, coupled with a lack of empirical research, may account for the disparate assessments that have recently appeared in the financial press. Recent headlines range from: "... Targeted stock: Shun It, Some Experts Say" 2 and "On the Wrong Track: Complex Financial Innovations Like Tracking Stocks ... Bring Few Benefits to Shareholders" 3 to numerous claims by others, including many practitioners, that tracking stocks "unlock value," 4 or, possibly, "unleash value." 5 Understanding the reaction of financial markets to announcements of a firm's intention to reorganize under a tracking stock structure is therefore interesting and relevant on its own merits. It would also, however, contribute directly to the established literature detailing the reaction of share prices to announcements of other restructurings. Several authors, including Schipper and Smith (1983) , have estimated a mean abnormal return of about 3 percent associated with an announcement of a firm's intention to spin-off a subsidiary. 6 Schipper and Smith (1986) estimate a mean abnormal return of about 2 percent associated with an announcement of an equity carve-out. Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987) estimate a mean abnormal return of about 1.7 percent associated with a total or partial asset sale.
Several hypotheses have been offered to explain these findings. One category, broadly defined, suggests that investors expect gains, possibly due to decreased agency costs, from more focused and transparent business units. For example, Schipper and Smith (1983 , 1986 , and 1989 suggest that because carve-outs and spin-offs require a commitment to increased financial disclosure, they may facilitate the implementation of improved incentive schemes or otherwise improve the ability of shareholders to monitor management. More formally, Milgrom (1988), Bagwel, and Zechner (1993) and Harris and Raviv (1996) show how asymmetries between lower level and top management-in information, preferences, or incentives-may result in an inefficient allocation of capital. Empirically, Desai and Jain (1999) find that spin-offs that increase focus earn positive long-run abnormal returns. Vijh (1999) finds some evidence that improved focus is a determinant of the long-run performance of carved-out subsidiaries. Alternatively, Nanda (1991) suggests that the positive abnormal returns from carve-outs may be due to transitory differences between the market value and managers' perceived value of both the subsidiary and the parent firm. Nanda shows that when such differences exist, managers may find it optimal to finance new equity through a carve-out, which signals markets that managers believe the parent firm to be undervalued. Empirically, Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro (1995) analyze the share-price reaction of rivals to firms that announce voluntary asset divestitures and find evidence in support of this view.
Another hypothesis, offered by Schipper and Smith, suggests that investors value the relatively "pure-play" investment opportunities created by carve-outs, since the pure-play allows investors to invest separately in the subsidiary without simultaneous investment in the parent. However, arbitrage dictates that this should matter only to the extent that the new pure-play is unique.
Tax and regulatory considerations may also play a role, as both Schipper and Smith (1983) and Hite and Owers (1983) find that a substantial number of firms in their samples expect to benefit through such considerations.
Given the related nature of spin-offs, carve-outs, and tracking stocks, it seems reasonable to ask whether the observed abnormal returns associated with announcements of each are consistent with one hypothesis. Unlike spin-offs, tracking stocks do not yield tax or regulatory advantages relative to the consolidated corporation. Tracking stocks also do not exploit transitory differences in valuations in the same manner as carve-outs, since tracking stocks frequently raise no new equity capital.
However, tracking stocks, like carve-outs and spin-offs, do tend to result in more focused business units committed to increased financial disclosure. The empirical finding that announcements of each earn positive abnormal returns is therefore consistent with the hypothesis that investors expect gains from more focused and transparent business units.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section provides more details on tracking stocks. The third section presents an overview of the methodology with additional details included in an appendix. The fourth presents the data and empirical results, and the fifth concludes.
Tracking Stocks, Carve-Outs, and Spin-Offs
The formation of an equity structure based on tracking stock is, in some respects, similar to a spin-off or a carve-out, but with considerable differences. In both spin-offs and carve-outs, a new corporate entity is created by distributing equity in a subsidiary, where it then begins trading publicly. A spin-off distributes the equity of the spun-off subsidiary to the shareholders of the parent as a dividend, resulting in no new equity financing. Typically the parent firm relinquishes control over the subsidiary by retaining little or no equity ownership.
In a carve-out, the parent corporation sells a portion of the equity in the subsidiary, either as an initial public offering by the subsidiary itself or as a seasoned offering by the parent. Either method results in new equity financing. Due to tax considerations the parent firm typically maintains at least 80 percent of the voting rights and a majority interest in the carved-out subsidiary.
Under both restructurings, shareholders in the new corporate entity possess the rights conventionally due shareholders: the right to elect a board of directors to oversee management, the right to vote on matters of great importance, and a claim against the new entity's net assets.
In contrast, the formation of an equity structure based on tracking stock does not create a new corporate entity. A tracking stock structure is formed by creating a new class of common stock, within an existing diversified corporation, whose value is linked to the performance of a specific business group through special provisions introduced into the firm's articles of incorporation. This link is usually strongest through a limited claim on the earnings generated by the division. Typically, the dividends paid are dependent on the earnings generated by the tracked group in a structured fashion-either as a fixed percentage of the tracked group's net income or as a specific dollar amount that is adjusted over time according to net income or shareholders' equity (see Logue, Seward, and Walsh 1996) . The upper bound on dividends for the tracked group is therefore comparable to the amount that would be available had the division been spun-off or carved-out. This analogy is not exact because the group may share with the parent firm the use and cost of inputs that are relatively fixed, such as corporate offices and payroll services, that it otherwise would not as separate corporate entity.
Shares in the tracking stock may be distributed either as a public offering, as dividends to existing shareholders, or as currency for an acquisition. The first method results in new equity financing, although it has been used less frequently.
As with carve-outs and spin-offs, the physical assets of the consolidated firm are divided and attributed to the particular business groups. Unlike carve-outs or spin-offs, however, this division is solely for accounting purposes-a tracking stock does not represent a legal claim on the assets of the associated business group. Rather, a tracking stock represents a claim on a fraction of the assets of the consolidated firm. For example, in the event of liquidation of the parent corporation, the claim would typically be dependent on the proportion of the total market value accounted for by each class of stock. In the event that assets of the tracked group are sold, the parent might be obligated to distribute the proceeds as a special dividend or as a share repurchase.
8
The tracked group is also not governed by a separate and independent board of directors. It is governed by the directors of the parent firm, with the shareholders typically having voting rights that float with the market value of their tracking stock relative to that of the total market capitalization of all classes of common stock for the firm. Such distribution of voting rights ensures that the votes per dollar of market value are approximately equal for each class of common stock, but they also imply that the directors will answer to at least two groups of stockholders with potentially very different and competing interests. The interests of each tracked group will therefore be subordinate to the interests of the consolidated firm.
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There are, then, at least two related aspects in which a tracked business group will behave differently than the independent corporate entity created by a carve-out or a spin-off. First, the directors may not have an incentive to strategically manage the tracked business group in its own best interests, and, second, there exists the opportunity for considerable cross-subsidization across business groups, either through exposure to the liabilities of the consolidated firm or through purposeful redirection of resources. Both of these factors would tend to reduce the extent to which the tracked business group represents a pure-play to investors relative to a carved-out or spun-off sub-sidiary, but they should not impede expected gains in managerial efficiency through the design of and implementation of improved incentive structures or the ability of shareholders to more closely monitor the management of the individual business groups.
As mentioned in the previous section, the empirical evidence on carve-outs and spin-offs indicates abnormal returns in the days associated with the announcement of 2 percent to 3 percent. Given the features of tracking stocks outlined here, if investors expect gains from more focused and transparent business units, we should expect to observe abnormal returns of a similar magnitude, although tempered by the extent to which investors view the lack of autonomy by the tracked business group as a liability.
Methodology
The methodology we employ is relatively standard to event studies. For each firm we estimate abnormal returns beginning 51 days prior to the announced event by calculating the daily difference between the actual return on that firm's equity and a forecasted "normal" return. We then calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) by summing the abnormal return on consecutive trading days. Normal returns are defined as the forecast from a market model conditional on the contemporaneous return on a market index, where the parameters of the market model are estimated for each firm over a 230-day estimation window, ending 51 days prior to the event. Our market index is the Standard and Poor's 500. Other authors, such as Spiess and Graves (1999) , have found that single-factor models produce results comparable to those from, for example, multi-factor models, such as a three-factor model based on Fama and French (1993) . In calculating our test statistics, we relax a simplifying assumption common to event studies that the sampling error of the estimated parameters is zero, even though our estimation window is large. In practice, our test-statistics are somewhat smaller in magnitude when we account for sampling error-on the order of 10 percent or so. The details of the estimation methodology are included in the appendix.
Data and Results
Prior to December 31, 1999, there were 51 announcements by managements proposing a tracking stock, beginning with General Motors in 1984. These were identified by searching the news archives, The Wall Street Journal, the Dow Jones Newswire, The New York Times, and other major news sources; searching SEC documents; and verifying against published lists of currently trading tracking stocks. It is possible that this method may have failed to identify a firm receiving little press coverage that announced an intention to issue a tracking stock but subsequently canceled, but this number, if not zero, is likely to be very small. The announcement need not indicate a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, but rather indicate an intention by management to formally propose the tracking stock to shareholders. The nine announcement dates prior to February 1995 are identical to those indicated by Logue, Seward, and Walsh (1996) , except one, the date for Ralston, for which we found a published announcement three days prior. 10 In order to properly identify the effects associated with the announcement of the tracking stock, we also exclude announcements contaminated by significant confounding events, as described below. Earlier studies, such as Billett and Mauer (2000) and Zuta (1999) , are constrained by very small Notes: This table reports summary information on the announcements of tracking stocks. The note "acquisition" indicates the number of tracking stock announcements that were intended for use in the acquisition of another company. The note "canceled" indicates the number of tracking stock announcements that were subsequently canceled. The date indicates the date the announcement appeared in a printed news source, which is usually one day after the actual announcement.
a Indicates firm that is excluded from the sample of 35 firms, either because the announcement was for an acquisition or because there was a significant simultaneous announcement. b Indicates firm that is excluded from the sub-sample of 32 firms because of a simultaneous announcement.
samples from before 1998 and therefore do not exclude all announcements that are contaminated by simultaneous events. The announcement day (t=0 in event time) is defined as the day that news of the announcement appeared in a printed news source. Any share price reactions to tracking stock announcements should therefore be captured at t=-1 or t=0. Table 1 details the main features of these announcements. More than half of the announcements, 23, have occurred in the 2 years prior to December 1999. During that period, there has been an increase in the concentration of parent firms in technology-oriented industries, such as the communication and chemical and allied products (which includes pharmaceutical) industries. Earlier announcements were more evenly distributed among manufacturing industries, such as auto and truck manufacturing, food products, coal mining, utilities, and paper products. Of the 51 total announcements, one was by a foreign-based company, and nine proposed introducing a tracking stock in conjunction with the acquisition of another firm. Because the simultaneous announcement of an acquisition confounds identification of the share price response to the tracking stock announcement, this study considers only those announcements by firms proposing to split their existing business groups into a tracking structure, which leaves a population of 41 announcements.
Of these 41 announcements, one was by a firm, Ziff-Davis, that first went public only 113 trading days previously, which leaves a relatively short and volatile window for estimating the parameters of the market model. This firm is dropped from the sample. Five other firms made other major announcements concurrent with the announcement of the tracking stock. The first, Viacom, made three announcements on the same day: the proposed tracking structure for its Blockbuster business group, that earnings for the Blockbuster business group would be 15 percent to 20 percent FIGURE 1. MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR) FOR SAMPLES OF 32 AND 35 FIRMS lower than the year prior, and that the chief executive of the Blockbuster business group was resigning unexpectedly.
11 Several sources cited by the New York Times, including the chairman of Viacom, emphasized the role of the resignation in determining the market's reaction, which was described as "reeling." Incyte announced a tracking stock simultaneously with an acquisition of another firm, and some news releases are ambiguous as to whether the tracking stock was intended to finance the acquisition. Fletcher Challenge, in its second announcement in 1996, announced the tracking stock concurrently with earnings and other news. Epitope announced the tracking stock concurrently with the acquisition of another firm. Electronic Arts announced a tracking stock simultaneously with an agreement to be the dominant provider of games to American Online and to acquire another company. Because these other news events clearly confound identification of the effects associated with the tracking announcement, these firms are also dropped from the sample. This leaves a sample of 35 announcements.
In addition, three other firms, Ralston, Agouron, and J. C. Penney, made other news announcements on the same day as their proposed tracking stock structure. Although it is difficult to gauge precisely the expected impact of these other news announcements, there is some evidence to suggest it may be small. Ralston and Agouron reported earnings that, according to Valueline forecasts, may have been slightly less than expected. J. C. Penney made a restructuring announcement that was unrelated to the tracking stock and featured much less prominently in news accounts. We recognize that these simultaneous announcements, even if their impact is small, confound identification of the reaction to the tracking stock announcement, so we report results for the sub-sample of 32 firms that omits all firms with simultaneous announcements, although we also include results for the sample of 35 announcements that includes these three announcements.
Six announcements proposing a tracking stock structure were subsequently canceled, and several others are pending shareholder approval. 12 The cancellations usually occurred either because the proposal was rejected by shareholder vote, or because management withdrew the proposal prior to a vote by shareholders due to negative feedback. These firms are included in the sample because we are interested in measuring the share price effects associated with the announcement of an intention to issue a tracking stock, regardless of whether the tracking stock was subsequently issued. Deleting these firms from the sample would introduce a positive survivorship bias, since our sample would include only those announcements that, ex-post, were well received by shareholders. However, for comparison, we also report summary results with these firms deleted from the full sample.
Estimation Results
We estimate the parameters of the market model for each firm over a 230-day interval, ending 51 days prior to the announcement, using the Standard and Poor's 500 as the market index. We then compute abnormal returns beginning 50 days prior to the published announcement, although we focus attention on the event interval from -1 to 0, given our definition of day 0 as the day the announcement appeared in a printed source. Figure 1 reports the mean cumulative abnormal return averaged across firms beginning 50 days prior to the announcement. There is relatively little movement from zero for dates -50 to -35, then the mean CAR slowly rises, with a drop beginning about 15 days prior to the announcement. About four days prior to the event, the mean CAR rises more rapidly, with a noticeably sharp spike upward during the two-day announcement period, before leveling out afterwards. This is clearly consistent with positive share price reactions to tracking stock announcements. Table 2 reports the corresponding mean CAR, along with the mean abnormal return and a test statistic for the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal return for each individual day is zero. Results are reported for both the full sample of 35 firms and the sub-set of 32 firms that made no simultaneous news announcement. In the 19 days from -20 to -2 for the full sample, there are zero occurrences of statistically significant abnormal returns. The two greatest abnormal returns occur at days -1 and 0, with returns of 2.1 percent and 1.0 percent, respectively. They are also associated with the two greatest test statistics, 4.31 and 2.15, strongly rejecting the null of zero abnormal return on each day. This is very strong evidence in support of the hypothesis that the share price reactions to tracking stock announcements have been significantly positive and economically meaningful-about 3.1 percent over the two-day event period.
The results for the 32-firm sub-sample are qualitatively similar, although slightly less in magnitude. The two-day return from -1 to 0 is 2.6 percent, and the abnormal returns on days -1 and 0 have test-statistics of 3.35 and 1.83.
To further test whether the behavior of stock prices around the interval -1 to 0 is different from other intervals, we analyze the mean CAR over a sequence of intervals throughout the event period. These are reported in Table 3 . The test-statistic, asymptotically distributed N(0,1), for the full sample over the interval [-1,0 ] is 4.72, which is highly significant. The mean CAR from -50 to -2 slowly drifts upward to 1.4 percent, although not significantly so, before spiking upward on day -1. The total combined effect over the [-50,0] interval is 4.4 percent. Again, the results for the sub-sample of 32 firms are qualitatively comparable although slightly less in magnitude. The total effect over the interval [-50,0] is about 3.5 percent, and the upward drift from -50 to -2 is not significant. The CAR for the interval [-1,0] for the 32-firm sub-sample is also highly significant, with a test-statistic of 3.78.
The results from the evenly spaced six-day intervals from -50 to +2 are similar. The only interval for which the CAR is significantly different from zero is the interval [-5,0] , which includes the tracking stock announcement.
The empirical results thus far are strongly suggestive of a positive share-price reaction to tracking announcements, but it is possible that since we have examined only aggregations across firms that they could be influenced by a relatively small subset of firms. We examine this issue in tables 4 through 6 and figures 2 and 3. Notes: This table reports the daily abnormal returns for the 11-day period surrounding the announcement and the cumulative abnormal return over the interval [-1,0] for each firm in the sample. The reported test statistic is for the null hypothesis that CAR i [-1,0] 
where N is the total number of "trials," p is the probability of a particular outcome under the null, and N* is the actual observed number of particular outcomes. For the full sample, N = 35, N* = 32, and p = 5. Table 4 , eleven firms earned positive abnormal returns on both day -1 and 0. Only one firm, K-Mart, earned negative abnormal returns on both days. 13 The CAR over the interval [-1,0] is positive for 30 of the 35 firms. It is positive and statistically significant at the .10 level for 11 of the 35 firms, while it is negative and significant for none of the firms. Under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns, half of the firms should have a CAR over [-1,0] that is negative. A non-parametric percentiles test, reported in Table 5 , for this null is strongly rejected, with a test statistic of 4.23. In particular, the test-statistic is
where N is the total number of "trials," p is the probability of a particular outcome under the null, and N * is the actual observed number of particular outcomes. For the full sample, N=35, N * =32 and p=.5. Figure 3 presents a plot of the CAR for each firm and, in the lower right-hand corner, the mean CAR aggregated across firms (this is the same mean CAR depicted in Figure 1 ). For comparison, the vertical axes are constrained to -.35 and +.35. There is again evidence of substantial idiosyncratic noise in the individual firm data, although the tendency for the CARs to increase around the announcement date is still evident. Comparing the firm CARs with the averaged CAR in the lower right-hand panel illustrates the dramatic smoothing effect of averaging the CARs across firms. Constrained to the same scale, virtually the only detectable effects are slow drift upward prior to the announcement and the spike in the two-day announcement period.
The reported results are not sensitive to the specification of the estimation window, the event window, or the methodology. We tried several different estimation windows 14 and event windows with essentially no change in the statistical inference and virtually no change in the relevant point estimates. We also used, in a previous version of the paper, the methodology outlined in Schipper and Smith (1986) , which ignores sampling error and estimates the variances of the disturbances over separate window, and found very similar results.
The reported results are also consistent across various sub-samples of firms, as reported in Table 6 . Excluding the six firms that subsequently canceled their proposed tracking stocks, the mean CAR over [-1,0] is 3.3 percent, which is slightly larger than over the full sample and suggests that the canceled tracking stocks were, on average, slightly better received by investors on the announcement day.
To guard against the possibility that the results are dominated by a few firms early or late in the sample, we break down the summary statistics over the first 18 tracking stock announcements and the last 17. The first 18 announcements, which occurred prior to December 1998, had a positive CAR over [-1,0] of 3.5 percent, while the most recent 17 tracking stock announcements had a positive CAR over [-1,0] that was somewhat smaller, about 2.7 percent. Both are highly significant.
Finally, including the five tracking stock announcements that are contaminated by simultaneous announcements, for a sample size of 40, also yields a positive CAR over [-1,0] of 2.7 percent.
Conclusion
This paper provides some empirical evidence on reaction of share prices to announcements proposing the adoption of an equity structure based on tracking stock. By comparing returns rela-tive to those predicted by a market model, we find a mean abnormal return of over 3 percent in the two-day period surrounding the announcement for a sample of 35 firms. Individually, 30 of the 35 firms earned positive abnormal returns. Statistically, these results are significant and robust to alternative estimation windows and across various subsets of firms.
These estimates are comparable to previous estimates of abnormal returns associated with announcements of two relatively similar equity restructurings, carve-outs and spin-offs. The empirical finding that announcements of all three forms of equity restructurings earn positive abnormal returns is consistent with the hypothesis that investors expect gains from more focused and transparent business units-possibly through improved incentive structures or the ability to more closely monitor the management of the individual business groups.
Important areas for future research include providing empirical evidence on the source of the observed abnormal returns, such as whether they are in fact due to greater focus, as well as providing empirical evidence on why some firms choose a tracking stock equity structure instead of another form of restructuring, such as a carve-out or spin-off. 
where R i * , R m * and X i * denote data over the event window, which is of length L 2 . By standard econometric theory, the abnormal returns are conditionally mean zero with conditional variance
The first term on left hand side of (4) is the portion of the conditional variance due to the disturbances, and the second term is the portion of the conditional variance due to sampling error in the estimated parameter vector i . The sampling error converges to zero as the length of the estimation window L 1 increases, so for long estimation windows the sampling error is frequently ignored, although we do not do so here. We can aggregate abnormal returns over periods in the event window to calculate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR). The estimated CAR for firm i from period 1 to 2 is CAR i ( 1 , 2 ) = i * with variance V i , where is an (L 2 x1) vector with ones in elements 1 through 2 and zeros elsewhere.
A test statistic for the null hypothesis that the cumulative abnormal return for firm i is zero can be constructed by standardizing the cumulative abnormal return by an estimate of its unknown true standard error. The resulting statistic is distributed Student-t under the null with L 1 -2 degrees of freedom. That is, To test the significance of the CARs across firms, we calculate the mean cumulative abnormal return as N N CAR i ( 1 , 2 ) = 0. A test statistic that is valid asymptotically (i.e., for large number of firms) for the null hypothesis that this mean CAR is zero is constructed by dividing the mean CAR by an estimate of its unknown true standard error. Invoking the usual assumption the CARs across firms are uncorrelated, the test statistic is As indicated, this test statistic is distributed Gaussian with unit variance as the number of events becomes very large.ˆˆˆâ
